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"Intellectual abilities and cognitive controls are not
isolated aspects of cognitive organisation, but are
mutuallr interrelated. The arbitary distinction that has
sometimes been maintained between intelligence and broad
scale organisation of cognition thus seem inappropriate_"
Gardner, Jackson and Messick
(1960 p123)
"An environment must be suited to the species; if it isn't,
the organism dies or goes elsewhere."
Sanford (1962 p727)
"While it may be true that pearls come from aggravated
oysters, you can only get milk from contented cows.
Pearls and milk each have their uses and people will
exercise their preference for one or the other, but it
would be a point~ess exer~ise in freedom to insist on
milking oysters." Stern (1962 p9)
"Few would dispute that a major goal of education is to
instil in students a differentiated view of the world in
which they live. Whether our concern is foreign or
domestic politics, religion, literature, art or science,
we should consider the educational entrprise a success to
the extent that students bring a multidimensional outlook
to bear upon particular domains. Primitive categorisations
•••• will generally fail to do justice to the complexity
present in most environmental events."
Nathan Kogan (1971 p274-5)
o
I ABSTRACT
This study is concerned with patterns of information search
and utilisation, and the effect these have on the areas of academic
interest and the level of achievement within these areas as a
result a fit between the individual and his environment. In
particular, the study deals with the scholar's level of cognitive
complexity as described by Harvey, Hunt and Schroder (1961) and
the effect such complexity level has upon subject preference in
the final school year and whether this in turn effects the level
of competence and achievement of the pupil.
It will be argued that individual differences in cognitive
style or information processing strategies act as moderator
variables, resulting in a preference for and relative success in
some rather than other domains of intellectual activity. A
distiQction is drawn between styles that encourage the consideration
of a fairly wide range of variables, and those that favour a more
restricted range in any given situation. Furthermore, it is
argued that the natural sciences, in nature and educational aims,
favour individuals with restricted styles, while the arts and
humanities favour the "broader" cognitive styles.
A link is drawn between these styles and the complexity of
the individual's cognitive structure, and the hypothesis is tested
that a preference for and success in the arts as against the sciences
is a function of an increase in complexity. Results in support of





A convenient take-off point in an account of the historical
development of which this study can be seen to be a continuation
is the epistemology of Kant. Kant, in accounting for Man's know-
ledge of his universe, found it necessary to distinguish between
two aspects of this knowledge - phenomena and noumena. By phenomena
Kant meant the everyday world of "sense-data" - that which is
perceived and/or experienced; by noumena he meant an ultimate
reality beyond experience, a metaphysical realm upon which the
experience of of the phenomena depended. In other words, Kant's
philosophy postulates an absolute reality beyond our experience
and upon which our experience (and hence our knowledge) depends.
However, this propositon is ad hoc in nature and undemon-
strable. Even Kant had to concede this, stating that in fact
nothing could be said of the noumena except the necessity of
their existence, for all knowledge of this metaphysic~l realm
is achieved only through experience. Furthermore, according to
Kant, this knowledge is governed by certain interpretative
"categories of mind" which act as parameters or limits of exper-
ience - these "categories" include time, space, causality, etc.
(Today these would probably be termed universals of cognition or
experience. )
What is important here is Kant's observation that knowledge of
the world is essentially subjective, phenomenal, though of
course certain central aspects of experience are shared and by
common/••••
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common usage come to be more or less well defined. However,
we can never know the objective, metaphysical world of noumena.
This leads to the observation generally overlooked by psychology
in the past, especially the positivistic learning theory of
early behaviour.ism, namely that the world is always and only a
vlOr'ld as interpreted by the individual, i.e. we do not m, r~'_y
perceive the world but we actively order it. An examinati0n
of the perceptual constancies, especially those of vision -
shape, colour, size} form - points to the important role played
by central cognitive processes even at a perceptual level. As
long ago as 1905, Potebnya noted that "Between the thing and
cognition there always comes the sum of acquired abilities and
tradition~" (Quoted by Morton 1971 p646o) The role of cul tural
and linguisti.c differences in the cognitive pr,jcessec. ljnguistj('
relativism etc. are all vital to this view of perception anu
cognition as interpretation.
In order to understand the development, and hence the nature,
of the interpretative structure the individual employs in his
transaction with the world, Piaget (eg 1932) looks at the intel-
lectual growth of the child and concludes that it,is built up in
a number of steps from the child's experiences by processes
of differentiation and integration - or as he terms it, as a
result of assimilation and accommodation. Piaget argues that the
child progresses from birth to maturity through a series of stages,
each more complex than, and building, on, the previous stage.
Essentially we have a circular process whereby the child as-
siJ1J.ilates or interprets the world in terms of a certai.n on£oine;
frame/ ••••
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frume of reference or schema, until the schemata used prove
to be no longer adequate in their primitive categorisation of
what is perceived and diseguilibrium occurs. At this stage
a major reorientation of the child's basic assumptions (accom-
modation) results, and a new psycholo£ical framework or set of
schemata is laid down, incorporating all that has gone before and
restoring equilibrium. This continuous circular process of
accommodation and assimilation finally results in a fairly well
organised and stable set of relations in terms of which the in-
dividual categorises his universe.
The learning history of an individual is generally so rich and
varjed that under slightly different circumstances two identical
sensory inputs will be interpreted in widely differing ways -
depending on how the stimulus is perceived - i.e. on which schema
is used. An example of this kind of multiple interpretation
or the use of Jifferent schemata is provided by a study in which
Humphrey (1933) successfully conditioned an arm withdrawal response
to a specific musical note (say IlGIl) using a shock as the UCS
and yet failed to elicit any wjthdrawal when a piece of music
was presented - despite the fact that the excerpt contained the
note "G" fourteen or fifteen times. This suggests that the cue
value of the note "G" in the "conditioning" schema was entirely
lacking when the interpretative schema was that of "music".
Thus, in accordance with Kantian epistemology, the cognitivist
conclusion is reached that Man's transactions in the world, and
with the world, is an active process of interpretation and
construction/•••
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construction in terms of a psychological frame of reference
laid down during the development of the child and continually
expanding and changing, becoming fairly stable with maturity but
continuing until intellectual growth ceases. Furthermore,
individuals and classes of individuals will differ in their
cognitive structure as a result of both biogenetic and exper-
iential fact?~s while sharing to a certain extent those elemenl~
common to his society.
5.
III COGNITIVE STYLE
As we have seen, individuals differ as a result of differences
in biological endowment, and environmental and socialisational
factors. The effects and interactions of these differences are
well known with respect to such phenomena as intelligence and do
not need elaboration here. Suffice it here to say that intellectual
performance is related to genetic structure as well as to environ-
mental factors of stimulation, linguistic skill and motivation.
Recent theory, however, has tended to move from a consideration
of the' products of intellectual activity to the processes involved.
Bruner (1963) has, for example, argued that any individual in an
interaction with the universe is confronted with masses of data,
too much in fact for him to handle. If he tries to take in
everything he suffers from "cognitive strain". In order to
avoid this, the individual is forced to categorise the data in
certain ways, adopting strategies of attention deployment and
limiting the amount of information processed. Thus to Bruner
and his colleagues (Bruner, Goodnow and Austin 1956) thinking
is essentially categorising behaviour. As a result of dif-
ferences in cognitive capacity and different levels of "strain"
tolerance, individuals adopt fairly stable categorising strategies
and display characteristic patterns of information selection,
processing and utilisation. These patterns of c?gnitive inter-
action are relatively stable within the individual, across all
cognitive modalities and Over time. They have come to be known
as cognitive styles.
Cognitive styles are thus defined as individual variation in
modes/••••
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modes of perceiving, remembering, and thinking, or as distinctive
ways of apprehending, storing, transforming and utilising infor~-
ationo (Kogan 1971 p.244)
Cognitive styles are distinguished from cognitive abilities
in that ability is concerned with level of skill whereas style
gives greater emphasis to the manner and form of the activity.
At the same time it can be argued that stylistic variables will
influence level of performance, acting as a moderator variable
or control mechanism, determininG the nature and the sequence
of the stages involved in the performance of the task. Differ-
ent tasks will require for optimum performance different
strategies and sequences and thus level of performance will
depend on the specific set and sequence of strategies brought
to bear on the task. Frederiksen (1969), in relating specific
cognjtive abilities to components of verbal learning, has, for
example, shown that the individual's level of ability was related
to the task characteristics and to the cognitive strategies adopted
by the individual. Specific abilities were found to be related
to different components of learning under the three conditions used
by Frederjksen, their operation being mediated by cognitive
strategies.
Messick (1972) believes that the cognitive style or set of
strategies adopted by the individual is rooted in early non-
intellective factors in the child's development.
"Personality traits may be especially important in med-
iating the development of cognitive skills, since certain
personali ty/ •••
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personality consistencies may tend to develop earlier
than cognitive ones, primarily because the child's initial
transactions with the environment implicate affective
and behavioural respones during a time when his cog-
nitive response capabilities are gradually evolving."
(1972 p362)
Thus, according to Messick
"Cognitive styles have been conceptualised as information
processing habits that develop in congenial ways around
underlying personality traits. They function to control
and regulate the course of information processing."
(1972 p364)
As a result of this shift in emphasis from the product to the
process involved in intellectual activity, recent research has
centred around the question of cognitive styles. Messick (1970)
has listed and described a number of the more important dimensions,
that have been identified and explored, both theoretically and
empirically, over the last twenty years. These include:-
I) Field independence vs. field dependence: an analytical, in
contrast to a global, way of perceiving (which) entails a tendency
to experience items as discrete from their backgrounds and reflects
ability to overcome the influence of an embedding context.
2) Scanning: a dimension of individual differences in the exten-
siveness and intensity of attention deployment, leading to individual
variations in the vividness of ~xperience and the span of awareness.
3) / •••••
3) Breadth of categorisation: Consistent preference for broad
inclusiveness, as opposed to narrow exclusiveness, in establishing
the acceptable range for specified categories.
4) Conceptualising styles:. individual differences in the tendency
to categorise perceived similarities and differences among stimuli
in terms of many differentiated concepts which is a dimension
called conceptual differentiation, as well as consistencies in the
utilisation of particular conceptualsing approaches as bases for
forming concepts (such as the routine use in concept formation
of thematic or functional relations among stimuli as opposed to
the analysis .of descriptive attributes or the inference of class
membership).
5) Reflectiveness vs impulsivity: individual consistencies in the
speed with which hypotheses are selected and information processed,
with impulsive subjects tending to offer the first answer that
occurs to the~, even though it is frequently incorrect, and reflective
sublects tending to ponder various possibilities before deciding.
6) Levelling vs sharpening: reliable variations in assimilation
in memory. Subjects at the levelling extreme tend to blur similar
memories and to merge perceived objects or events with similar but
not identical events recalled from previous experience. Sharpeners,
at the other extreme, are less prone to confuse similar objects
and, by contrast, may even judge the present to be less similar to
the past than is actually the case.
7)/•.••
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7) Constricted vs. flexible control: individual differences in
susceptibility to distraction and cognitive interferenceo
8) Tolerance for incongruous or unrealistic experiences: a
dimension of differential willingness to accept perceptions at
variance with conventional experience.
Other styles not mentioned by Messick (1970) that have been
investigated include:
9) Divergence/convergence - ideat~onal fluency in response to
open-ended tests vs ability in tests having only one potential
solution.
la) ~isk-taking - a style with motivational overtones descriminating
between cautious and risk-taking individuals.
Although these styles vary considerably in theoretical heritage
and with respect to cognitive mode in which they express them-
selves, they all seem to have one property in common - individu81s
tend either to take the world in large chunks and to look at it
in broad perspective, or to focus on a few highly relevant data
and to concentrate on these. It would seem that this latter
strategy has the advantage that one can select a few highly related
and task relevant pieces of information and focus attention on
them without risk of distraction. This makes for ease of-coding
or categorisation in terms of the pre-existing cognitive framework
(Bruner) and necessitates little accommodation (Piaget). However
this state of affairs is achieved at the expense of losing the
capacity to make rapid changes in one's cognitive structure.
On/•••
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On the other hand, taking in as much information as
possible
involves the risk of cognitive strain, necessitates
frequent
modification of existing categories and makes intell
ectual fun-
ctioning a more arduous take This strategy lea
ds to good pay~
offs in that it involves the advantages of being abl
e to change
one's existing mental structures v,ery readily, and o
f being able
to relate widely different-seeming data.
Thus we can make a gross distinction between those c
ognitive
styles which operate globally, seeking and using a w
ide range of
information, and those that are more restrictive in
their de-
limitation of the area of attention deployment. If
we argue that
anyone individual has a finite "cognitive capacity"
or ability
(though obviously individuals will differ in this ca
pacity), w~
can argue further that as the area of attention depl
oyment
increases, so the discrimination within the area is
reduced.
Conversely, for an individual of given intellectual
"capacity",
an increase in discrimination will result in a decre
ase in the
range of information being processed at anyone time
. An increa$e
in both parameters will lead to cognitive strain, w
hile a decrease
in both will lead to sub-optimal performance.
Hudson (1967, 1970) argues that the structure of tra
ditional
intelligence measures is geared primarily at tapping
the logical
precision dimensions, thereby favouring those indivi
duals with a
more restricting cognitive style. On the other ha
nd, the recent




while ignoring the qualitative details of test responses (See e.g.
Mednick's Remote Assosciations Test R.A.T.) and Guilford's tests
of divergent thinking, etc. ,which merely count the number of
responses to open-ended questions without judging the quality of
the responses - except in terms of their probability of occurrence.
No attempt is made to assess the appropriateness of responses.
Of the numerous styles that have been described, one that
has received a good deal of attention in recent literature is the
convergence / divergence dimension first isolated by J.P. Guilford.
It is to this style that we must now turn our attention.
12.
Guilford (1950) in trying to isolate those cognitive character-
istics involved in creativity drew a distinction between the
convergent and the divergent production of ideas. This distinction
was validated by factor-analytic techniques and these two factors
were later (1967) incorporated into his major work "The Structure
of the Intellect".
In short the convergent production of ideas is concerned with
those situations in which all the information points to a single
correct solution ego 'hot' is to 'cold' as 'wet' is to ' ••• '?
The divergent production of ideas on the other hand arises in those
situations wpere the individual is required to give as many
solutions to·a problem as possible. This latter property, which
is characterised by ideational fluency and flexibility, is best
measured by open-ended instruments ego '~~at are the uses of
(say) a brick?' or 'What have A & B got in common?' etc. Thus
a distinction is drawn between the generation of logic~l pos-
sibilities (i.e. divergence) and of logical necessities (i.e.
convergence) ~
Since Guilford's (1950) pioneering work, it has generally
been accepted that the creative individual is essentially divergent.
It is argued that divergence results in the fluid and prolific
generation of solutions to a problem and that this will be a
prerequisite for a novel and meaningful solution by freeing the
individual from the sterile exploration of dead-end alternatives.
Thus creativity came to be linked directly with the divergent
production/••••
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production of a large number of potential solutions to a problem.
By the mid-sixties, this basic paradigm had become fully en-
trenched and the terms "divergent" and "creative" had come to be
used almo~t synonomously, especially by American researchers.
Open-ended tests were (and still are to a large extent - See
e.g. Miller et. a1. 1970 and Nicholls 1972) labelled as "creativity
tests~'•
Within the educational system this stress on divergence and
ideational freedom has come to form the basis of much current
teaching practice. Thus for instance Sesrs and Hilgard (196#)
maintain that:-
"Teachers who are insistent on quiet orderly behaviour,
who teach by informative statements, produce task
'orientated behaviour favourable to convergent thinking;
teachers who show personal interest ana who avoid
critical individual evaluations tend to favour the
more creative products of divergent thinking"~
(Sears & Hilgard p208-9, my emphasis)
However, with the growing awareness that divergence by itself
is a very poor indicator of c~eative ability (worse, in fact,
than the IQ is as a predictor of academic suceess), a trend away
from equating divergence with creativity has become apparent.
Perhaps the most radical rejection of this theoretical position
has come from the British psychologist Lian Hudson who states
thClt lithe diverger has too readily been adopted as tl.e par'ldigm of
Creative Man" (1967 p159) and further that "Open-ended tests
are known throughout the United States as "creativity" tests.
Yet, as far as I can discover, there is scarcely a shred of.
factual/ ••••
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factual support for this." (1967 p126 my emphasis)
The work on which Hudson's two books (1967, 1970) is
based is
an exploration of those intellectual and personality
characteristics
that descriminate between individuals choosing an ar
ts or science
direction in English senior schools. Working with bo
th traditional
intelligence measures (in this case A.H.5 - see Heim
1956) and
open-ended tests, Hudson concludes that as far as cr
eativity is
concerned
"Original work will come from convergers and diverge
rs
alike; and divergence of an individual will determin
e
not whether he is original, but if he is original, t
he
field and style in which his originality will manife
st
itself. The roots of his originality lie not in his
convergence or divergence, but in other aspects of h
is
personality." (1967 p159)
However, more relevant to this thesis is Hudson's ma
in
conclusion that "the converger is attracted to the s
ciences and
the diverger is attracted to the arts" (1970 p13) an
d further
that
"Arts speci9.1ists are on the whole divergers, physic
al
scientists convergers. Between three and four diver
gers
go into arts subjects like History, English Literatu
re
and modern languages for everyone that goes into ph
ysical
science. And vice versaj between three and four con
vergers
do Mathematics, Physics and Chemistry for everyone
that
goes into arts." (1967 p56-7)
Hudson also believes that traditional intelligence m
easures
favour convergent thinking patterns rather than dive
rgent ones
with the result that scientists, ioe. convergers wil
l have higher
IQ scores than their divergent arts companions. By the same
token/ ••••
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token these scientists san be expected to be inferior on the
"Creativity" or divergent thinking tests.
"Most art specialists, weak at IQ tests, were much
better at the open-ended ones; most scientists were
the reverse."
(1967 p56)
In a closer analysis of the personality and intellectual fabric
of the converger and diverger, Hudson notes fairly well defined
syndromes characteristic of each type of individual. Convergers
as we have seen tend to do better at IQ testa. In addition,
they are characterised by a general conservatism and conformity
to group and peer values and are more likely to accept authority-
related cues as sufficient reason for his actions. He disapproves
of any deviation from the group norms and displa1s a general need
for order and certainty. Divergers, on the other hand, score
lower on I.Q. tests, but tend to be more tolerant and more open
in their belief systems. They tend to have a wider range of
interests and to be able to hold simul~aneouly apparently con-
flicting points of view. implying a wider frame of reference and
an ability to tolerate ambiquity and uncertainty.
16.
V COGNITIVE COMPLEXITY
One particularly useful approach to the question of
dif-
ferences in the cognitive structure by means of whic
h the indiv-
idua1 organises his world stems from the construct t
heory of
Ke11y (1955). Ke11y believed that Man is essentiall
y a scientist
and that he forms theories about the world fro~ his
experiences
and that he then tests the implications of these the
ories against
ensuing events, i.e. he is hypotheticodeductive and as K
elly
phrases it "anticipates events by construing their r
eplications" -
by postulating their outcomes. This is the construc
tion corollay
derived from his fundamental postulate, which states
that "a
person's processes are psychologically channellised
by the ways in
which he anticipates events". By this Kelly means t
hat the
individual acts according to his interpretation of t
he stimulus,
i.e. in terms of the schemata brought to bear on the
situation.
(See the description of Humphrey's (1933) conditioni
ng study above.)
Finally, Kelly believes that "persons differ from ea
ch other in
their construction of events". (The individuality c
orollary.)
(For a fuller explication of Kelly's theoretical pos
ition, see
Bannister and Mair 1968.)
According to Kel1y, Man interprets or construes his
world in
terms of a finite number of dichotomous or bipolar c
onstructs
(dichotomy corollary) against which the object of pe
rception is
judged. For ex~ple the concept MOTHER may possibly
be judged
in terms of the constructs SOFT-HARD, COMFORTING-DIS
TURBING,




often prelinguistic, uses triads of ego-involving pe
ople - parents,
teacher, girl-friend etc. - to establish a construct
that two
people in the triad have but the third lacks. Allin
dividuals are
then judged against this construct. Using a matrix
of such con-
structs known as the Role Repertory Grid (Rep Test),
any given
(social) object is made meaningful by being located in a
multi-
dimensional grid that constitutes the individual's p
sychological
space. Thus using the example of MOTHER above:
disturbing male
~ --------soft-- MOTHER -hard
~ ~
female comforting
Therefore the psychological meaning of any object fo
r the
individual is seen to lie at the point of intersecti
on of its
constituent constructs. (Compare this with Sassure'
s concept of
Semantics where the meaning of a word is located at
the point of
intersection of an infinite number of dimensions wit
hin a multi-
dimensional semantic space. "A given term is like t
he centre of
a constellation, the point at which an infinite numb
er of co-
ordinated points converge." (Quoted from Ullman 1962
p238o)
Developing from this theory and especially from Kel
ly's
individuality corollary that '~ersons differ from ea
ch other in
their construction of events", it is argued that the
se differences




in which they are used. We have seen above that although individuals
will differ in the constructs they habitually use in the anelysis
of any situation, the range of constructs available to him is
not in fact unlimited, being circumscribed by cultural and bio-
physical factors. However, individuals do differ in the number
of constructs they generally employ and the degree to which they
are interrelated. Differences in the number of constructs normall
used in interpreting the universe will have important consequences.
The use of only a few dimensions will result in a relatively
simplistic, compartmentalised view of the world in so far as the
individual will be able to make few, if any, alternative con-
structions of the situation. On the other hand, the cognitively
complex person who has a large number of constructu in an int-
ricately interrelated structure will have this ability, in that
the wide range of dimensions ensures that categorisation or
compartmentalisation is not absolute. As a result, he can be
expected to have a more involved, complex view of the world, to
be more relative in his judgements and to be able to tolerate a
greater degree of ambiguity and uncertainty than the cognitively
simple.
This prediction has been supported by a number of theorists.
Driver and Streufert (1965, 1966a, 1966b) and Schroder et al.
(1967), have shown e.g. that individual or group differences in the
complexity of conceptual structure account for some of the dif-
ferences in attitude change (Streufert, 1965), perception of others'
intentions and strategies (Streufert & Driver, 1965), decision-




orientation, information search, and information uti
lization (Kq r1ins
& Lamm, 1967; Stager, 1967; Streufert, Suedfe1d, & Driver, 196
5;
Suedfe1d & Streufert, 1966), and other areas concerned with soc
ial
interaction (Crano & Schroder, 1967; Sieber & Lanzetta, 1964;
Tuckman, 1964).
Bieri (1968) too has shown that in impre.sion-format
ion
situations, where individuals are presented sequent
ially with two
accounts of some person or object containing contrad
ictory in-
formation about the person or object, subjects rated
as cognitively
simple sqow far greater recency effects than complex
subjects who
tend to react to the conflicting information in a le
ss extreme
manner. As a result their final impressions are mor
e balanced
and better integrated than those of the cognitively
simple.
Numerous researchers (e.g. Bieri 1955 1961, Leventha
l 1957,
Tripodi & Bieri 1964) have all shown that complex individuals
are
better able to make discriminations among incongruen
t stimuli
than less complex individuals. Larsen (1971) sugges
ts that this
can be interpreted to mean that " cognitively complex
subjects can
differentiate, anticipate and react more appropriate
ly to their
environment." (p120) Similarly, Streufert and Schro
der (1964)
have shown that structurally simple persons respond
more directly
to immediate environmental information and tend to r
espond in a
less integrated, less strategic fashion than more co
mplex people.
MacNeil and Rule (1970) present evidence showing a p
reference for
complex information by complex individuals in a sens
ory deprivation




Generally the experimental evidence points to the fa
ct that
the individuals judged to be structurally simple are
less able
or willing to handle complex information than comple
x individuals
and that this occurs at all levels of information se
lection and
utiliz~tion. Bieri (1968) proposes that this results from the
fact that the cognitively complex subject has more s
tructure in
his cognitive system than a simple subject. Thus th
e complex
person has a larger network of interacting construct
s which makes
his reference point much broader and more diffuse th
an that of a
simple person. Because of this, the complex individ
ual is capable
of integrating diametrically opposed traits of a stim
ulus object
or person into a final ambivalent categorisation, wh
ile the simple
person shows a large recency effect. This would cor
respond to
the assertion that cognitively simple people are sen
sitive to a
"black-white" organisation, whereas complex people a
re sensitive
to shades of grey.
The simple individual can thus be expected to prefer
a fairly
circumscribed range of information, for to move beyo
nd these
confines will result in cognitive strain and will ne
cessitate a
"translation" or simplification of the data into a m
ore polarised
black-white relationship. This simplification of th
e incoming
information limits, in its turn, the integrative ab
ility of the
•
individual with a deleterious effect on his ability
to perceive
new relationships. (For an analysis of creativity~
n terms of
structural complexity, see Karlins 1967.)
21.
Measurement of Complexity
The measurement of cognitive complexity has taken one of two
broad directions. Bieri and his colleagues (Bieri1966, 1968;
Crockett 1965; Scott 1962, 1963) have based their measurement
techniques on modifications of Kelly's (1955) Repertory Grid to
obtain fairly specific and quantifiable measures of such struct-
ural properties as construct differentiation (number of constructs),
articulation (number of segments within a given construct) and
other aspects of what MacNeil (In press) has termed dimensional
integrative complexity.
An alternative approach to the measurement of complexity, and
the one used in this study, is based on a general assessment of the
individual's ability to integrate and utilise information. This
measure looks not to the number of constructs used (differentiation),
but to the conceptual and combinatory rules used by the person in the
organisation and utilisation of the information. (This measure of
what MacNeil, in press, has termed rule integrative complexity is
thus an indirect measure of cognitive complexity and is, as a re-
sult, less specific. Analysis of rule integrative complexity
involves a semi-projective technique in which the individual is
asked to express his views on a number of ego-involving situations
and judgement then made on the complexity of the thought processes
used by the individual. Schroder (e.g. Schroder, Driver and
Streufert 1967) has used a Paragraph Completion Test in which the
individual is required to complete a paragraph beginning with
something like "Rules •••• " or "When I am criticised•••• ". Harvey
1966/••••
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(1966) uses a standardised format with the stem "Thi
s I believe
about •••• " in conjunction with a number of referents
such as
"The American way of life", "Friends", "Guilt", etc.
This study
used Harvey's "This-I-Believe" Test (TIBT), thou.gh t
he items
used were not always the same as his.
Now, according to Harvey and his co-workers (Harvey
1966;
Harvey, Hunt and Schroder 1961; Greaves 1971a, 1971b
) the complx-
ity of the individual's cognitive structure results
in him adopting
characteristic ways of behaving and as a result, peo
ple can be
ascribed to one of four "systems" or levels of conce
ptual develop-
ment ranging from concrete, absolute modes of thinki
ng to abstract,
relative modes. Basic to this Conceptual Systems
Theory is the
belief that each level of conceptual development or
"system" has' an
unique constellation of response dispositions assosc
iated with it,
such that one can meaningfully distinguish between p
ersons on the
basis of their cognitive types. Person tend to act
and think
similarly to every other person at a given level of
complexity,
yet very differently from persons at another level.
(See Greaves
1971a p52). Scoring of the TIBT strives to place
the individual
at a given level that will best account for his obse
rved behaviour.
Briefly the characteristics of these four levels are
:-
SYSTEM 1 - most concrete.
High absolutism and closedness of thought and belief
systems;
high evaluativeness; high positive dependence on ins
titutional





SYSTEM 2 - second most concrete.
These individuals are characterised by a rejection o
f authority-
related cues, but at the same time are devoid of any
other reliable
and stable guidelines. Though they display negativ
e valence to-
wards the same referents that are of high positive re
levance to
system I individuals, it is important to note that b
oth use the
same external ~ources as points of reference.
SYSTEM 3 - more abstract.
The system 3 individual has a relatively well integrated con
cept-
ual structure but is dependent to a large extent on
group norms
and, with the exception of the conformity of the sys
teml person
to authority, shows the most acquiesence to the gene
ralised "other",
resulting in unthinking social accommodation and the
need for a
large number of friends, etc.
SYSTEM 4 - most abstract.
B~cause of their highly differentiated and integrated
conceptual
system, these individuals hold balanced and well con
sidered views
and are more reliant upon their own authority and mo
re accepting
of their own standards. They are neither indescrim
inate yielders
to, nor invariant rebels against, institutionalised
authority.
They display a low need for structure, relatively hi
gh tolerance
of ambiguity, a high ability to change "set" and a te
ndency to





In order to measure these response tendencies, Harvey includes
in his test such ego-involving referents as marriage, the American
way of life, religion, people, friendship, etc. The individual
is given two minutes in which to write at least two sentences
expressing his belief about these areas. Assessment of complex-
ity from the response protocols has a fairly high test-retest
reliability - in the high 80's based on several different studies
and stretching over 6 months. (Greaves 1971b) Inter-tester
reliability is also good, Greaves (ibid) reporting values of .90+,
though pointing out that the semi-projec ive nature of the test
requires fairly intensive training and a thorough understanding
of the theoretical underpinnings of the instrument. (p55-56)
Results reported by Schroder et al (1967) show that the P.C.T.
(Paragraph Completion Test) - and hence by implication the T.I.B.T.
as well - are not contaminated by verbal fluency (as judged by
length of sentence), nor by social desirability. In this study
correlations of .23 and .12 were obtained between complexity and
verbal and non-verbal I.Q. respectively. Finally, Greaves 1971b
reporting on item strength, shows a correlation of between .18 and
.43 with overall scores, depending on item tested.
25.
VI COMPLEXITY AND COGNITIVE STYLE
It is one of the primary aims of this study to sugge
st that
a potentially useful way of looking at all the diffe
rent cognitive
styles discussed above is that they are manifestation
s of a
single structure (Levi-Strauss e.g. 1963, Piaget 196
8). Piaget
defines structuralism as that which "seeks to explain
empirical
systems by postulating 'deep' structures from which
the former
are in some manner derivable" and speaks also of "tra
nsformational
interaction." (p98). Levi-Strauss would, for examp
le, maintain
that kinship hierarchies, religious practices, lingu
istic patterns,
marriage laws, etc. all reflect in different ways a
single tribal
structure, even though little direct correlation is
found between
any two aspects of the structure. Thus, what is bei
ng suggested
here is that all the cognitive styles described by e
.g. Messick
(1970) as well as the divergence/convergence styles
of Guilford
(1950) and Hudson (1967) all derive from a single su
perset or
structure which manifests itself in slightly differe
nt ways in
different areas of cognition. Furthemore, it is ar
gued here that
th~se various styles all reflect a structure that is
best charac-
terised in terms of its relative complexity or simp
licity. In
other words, structural complexity of simplicity is
seen as the
central unifying factor that accounts for the numero
us cognitive styles.
A number of theorists would disagree with this formu
lation. Bieri
(1961, 1966) regards complexity as relating solely t
o interpersonal
behaviour - "cognitive complexity may be defined as
the capacity to




Messick (1970- and Kogan (1971), .following Bieri, wo
uld suggest
that the simplicity/complexity dimension is merely an
other cognitive
style with implications for social interaction. Ho
wever, Bieri's
earlier work points to the possibility of the model
suggested above.
For example, he maintains (1961) that:-
"Cognitive complexity is assosciated with various sty
les of
response •••• These cognitive or response modes all
suggest cognitive processes characterised by the tend
ency
to make finer discriminations in perception. In th
is
regard we may cite Klein's concepts of levelling and
~harpening (1958), Mednick's findings of individual
dif-
ferences in stimulus generalisation tendencies (1955
),
the work on repressors or sensitizers (Gordon 1957)
and the work of Pettigrew (1958) and Wallach and Car
on
(1959) on categorising." (Bieri 1961 p359)
On the other hand, the model put forward is compatab
le with
Harvey, Hunt and Schroder's (1961) conception of com
plexity in so
far as they argue that the dimension applies to cogn
ition in general.
It should be noted that Bieri's meaSure of complexity
is based
exclusively on differentiation - the number of const
ructs or dimen-
sions used - while Harvey et a1 are concerned with th
e way in which
the constructs are used in the organisation and integ
ration of the
incoming information and as such their' measures yield
an index of
integrative complexity. Bieri employs a modificatio
n of Kelly's
Rep. Test, Harvey a paragraph completion technique.
The ease with which the numerous cognitive styles ca
n be ac-
counted for in terms of a structural complexity/simp
licity framework
gives support to this thesis. Fot example, the sty
les Bieri says




thus attributable to a more complex structure. W
itkin's field
dependence (Witkin et al 1962) can be interpreted as
the inability
of the individual to free himself perceptually from
his immediate
environment for reason of a limited number of constr
ucts, all of
which are context bound. A more complex structure
would permit
some external reference point, therby reducing the d
egree of
perceptual dependence. (A later formulation of t
his dimension as
a global as against an analytic style is significant
because of
its cognitive overtones.)· Similarly, breadth of c
ategorisation
and tolerance of ambiquity suggests a complex networ
k of interrelated
constructs that serve to provide a large number of "
contact points"
or construct intersections which, as we have argued
above, reduces
the degree of dissonance experienced.
Finally, evidence for this position is provided by r
eports of
correlation between the various styles. Wallach and
Kogan (1965)
report significant positive correlations between cat
egory breadth
and divergence, while Bieri, Bradburn and Galinsky (
1958) have
shown a significant relation between preference for
complex stimuli
(in the form of drawings) and field-in~ependence.. in
lnail:es. Ausubel
(1968) reports that "Open-minded individuals tend to
score higher
than closed-minded people on tests of verbal ability
, school ach-
ievement and ability to form remote verbal associati
ons." (p 173
My emphasis) Stones and Gordon (1972) conclude that
"the analytic
dimension of Kagan (Kagan et al 1963) and the field-i
ndependent
notion of Witkin (Witkin et al 1962) original11had m
any
similarities/••••
·It is interesting to note Piaget's concern with per
ceptual development
as one aspect of his theory of cognitive developmen
t - which process
can be seen to involve the "complexification" of the
cognitive
structure through hierarchisation and integration.
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similarities, but changes in emphases by the two rese
archers
and modifications of the measuring instrument have re
sulted in
two tests which are tapping different dimensions of
cognitive
style." (p190). It is further argued that converge
nce and diver-
gence are also manifestations of the individual's co
gnitive
structure and in particular that divergence is a cha
racteristic
of the structurally complex person while convergence
reflects a
structural simplicity.
The model put forward thus disagrees with those theo
rists who
would limit the concept of cognitive complexity to s
ocial behav-
iour (or any other single area of interaction.) Ra
ther, complexity
is seen as the degree of organisation (hierarchisatio
n and integration)
of the cognitive structure resulting from the Piaget
ian processes
of assimilation and accommod~tion which mediates the
interpretation
of what is perceived and/or experienced. Nor does
this necessarily
imply that an equal degree of complexity will be man
ifested in all
cognitive domains or across all cognitive tasks. I
t merely suggests
that structural complexity provides the underlying c
ompetence to
perform in a complex integrated way, and that this a
pplies equally
to intellectual and social phenomena. This formula
tion therefore
does not take sides in the domain specificity/genera
lity controversy
but suggests merely an "umbrelHttl Qr unifying concep
t giving rise
by way of transformations to the numerous cognitive
styles or
control mechanisms.
A brief look at the cognitive and personality variab
les attri~




and as divergent or convergent shows the degree to which these
concepts are interrelated.
1) The diverger is, by definition, able to give a large number of
responses to an open-ended question. This would suggest that
the stimulus item is located in a matrix with a wide range of
interrelated constructs, which by definition is indicative of
structural complexity.
2) Divergers, according to Hudson (1967) are capable of enter-
taining conflicting systems of values(p82) and are more
tolerant of ambiguity (p83). These are both properties of
the complex individual, who by dint of his network of constructs
is able to reconcile conflicting information.
3) The diverger "is liberal in his attitudes and seems less prone
than the converger to accept beliefs on trust or to think in
conventional terms." (pl09) A major characteristic of the
cognitively simple individual is his dependence on authority,
both secular and religious, and his unquestioning acceptance
of social norms and values. The converger disapproves of
deviation from the group.
4) Finally, Hudson (1967) notes that as an ego-defence the con-
verger uses a process of "compartmentalisation".
"The chie f virtue of this is that the person concerned
is able to zone his preoccupations, coping with them
one by one, rather than having to handle them simu;taneously.'
(p24)
thereby minimising cognitive load and the risk of subsequent
strain. This very fact of compartmentalisation implies a
restricted interaction between the various areas of conflict
and/ ••
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and between cognitive domains.
In summary, then, it is seen from Hudson '-s findings that con-
vergers are conservative and conform to group values coincides
with Harvey's et al findings that conceptually simple people are
authority related and have a strong need for order and structure.
On the other hand, the cognitively complex individual is more
relative in his judgements, less stereotyped in his behaviour and
more tolerant in his a tti tudes. That this is true also of
divergers, gives further strength to the argument that convergence
is symptomatic of structural simplicity, and that divergence re-
flects complexity.
In an attempt to understand and expand Hudson's (1967) findings
that divergers are drawn to the arts and convergers to the sciences,
it ,is necessary to examine briefly the characteristics peculiar
to each group of subjects and which serve to differentiate between
them. In other words, we must examine the "task requirements"
involved in learning the two types of material, and must find some
reaSon for this apparent preference.
31.
VII TASK REQUIREMENTS
If we look even briefly at the structure and intellec
tual
demands of the various areas of knowledge, it will b
e seen that
these range on a continuum from "fact" to "opinion",
that is, from
the empirical and demonstrable to the logical and me
taphysical.
Hirst (1969) distinguishes between the following dom
ains of know-
ledge, each characterised by its own internal structu
re and level
of objectivity:- Mathematics, Physical Sciences, Hum
an Sciences and
History, and the Fine Arts, Morals, Religion and Phi
losophy. (p151)
Hajnal (1972), in his turn, d~inguishes between wha
t he terms
formal and descriptive or non-formal types of subjec
t domain.
Of the formal subjects, he notes:
"Because the learner must proceed systematically from
the less to the more advanced parts of the subject,
one
may liken the learning of "formal" knowledge to the
climbing of a ladder. One cannot reach the top of
the
ladder except by climbing over the lower steps. If
the
gap between the rungs is too great, one cannot climb
at
all. An attempt to skip too many rungs will end in
failure." (p162)
On the other hand, descriptive subjects are characte
rised by
a lack of objectivity which necessitates a personal
selection
and evaluation of what is to be regarded as relevant
to the issue
in question, and what is not relevant.
Jevons (1969), in a consideration of general educati
onal aims,
distinguishes two processes - the acquisition of dep
th and the
acquisition of breadth. Depth in education is seen a
s "a function




takes to really master some subject area. The area m
ust nec-
essarily be small, but the student Can acquire real
familiarity
with it and come to know his way about it •••• ". Brid
th, on the
other hand, "means coming to see the subject area in
its setting
and with its implications, developing an overview ra
ther than
tunnel vision". (pl14)
If we now look at Ballard's (1971) description of the
aims
of teaching History, we can see that History is esse
ntially a
descriptive subject (in Hajnal's 1972 sense) and is
concerned with
the acquisition of breadth (in Jevons' 1969 sense.)
"The justification for History teaching does not lie
in
the acquisition of specified portions of the sum tot
al
of fact. In Mathematics or Physics a pupil must ma
ster
one skill before he can progress to another. Histo
rical
judgements are not built up in this way. There is n
o
single event or historical character which rates as
a
sine qua non in an History syllabus. Some may be m
ore
desirable .than others, but none is essential. The
justifi~ation of the study of History at the school
level
lies in the acquisition of breadth." (p6)
The sciences on ~e other hand, can be seen to invol
ve what
Jevons (1969) terms depth processes. At the same ti
me, the sciences
can be seen to involve a progression from the less to
the more
advanced parts of the subject and as such the scienc
es are formal
in structure. Thus it is argued that the arts subj
ects are
essentially descriptive in nature and depend for the
ir validity on
the relative importance attached by the individual to
the dif-
ferent contributing variables. On the other hand,
the sciences




level, are anchored on a bedrock of observable facts
and by
their own criteria of inter-subjectivity yield verifi
able and
thus absolute answers to problems in a way that the a
rts and
humanities cannot. Thus it is argued that the scien
ces are
concerned with absolutes while the arts involve selec
tion, inter-
pretation, and evaluation of material in what can on
ly be a
subjective process - there are no "correct" solution
s. Hajnal (1972)
says of the Arts subjects
"The subjects on which an Arts student has to write a
re
fairly general, and often quite abstract. Question
s
are involved to which no simple answer based on facts
is possible; the problems raised are not ones to whi
ch
there are unique corre ct solutions." (p141)
A recent analysis of the structure of academic areas
at Illinois
University (Biglan 1973) shows a major dimension tha
t distinguishes
the natural sciences, engineering and agriculture fro
m social
sciences, education and the humanities. Biglan not
es that this
dimension refers to the internal structure of the su
bjects, and ,that
"a good short-hand label for the dimension is 'hard-
soft'.
The dimension appears to provide one kind of empiric
al
support for Kuhn's analysis of the paradigm. By 'p
aradigm'
Kuhn (1962) refer.s to a body of theory which is sub
scribed
to by all members of the field. The paradigm serve
s an
important organising function ••• Fields that have
a single
paradigm will be characterised by greater consensus
about
content and method than will fields lacking a paradig
m. Kuhn
specifically designates physical and biological scien
ces as
paradigmatic while the humanities and education area
s are
non-paradigmatic." (p20l-202 My emphasis.)
In order to understand the fundamental differences b
etween these
two/••••
two domains of knowledge, it is necessary to consider Hayek's
(1967) work on pattern recognition. In discussing differences
between simple and complex phenomena, Hayek notes the following:
"There seems to exist a fairly easy and adequate way to
measure the degree of complexity of different kinds of
abstract patterns. The minimum number of elements of
which an instance of the pattern must consist in order
to exhibit all the characteristic attributes of the class
of patterns in question appears to provide an unambiguous
criterion". p25
In other words, Hayek is maintaining that for a pattern or
object to be regarded as "simple", it must be able to be defined
or accounted for in terms of relatively few variables - or to
switch back to earlier phraseology, it must be seen to exist at
the intersection of relatively few constructs.
He goes on to describe two kinds of complex phenomena:- one
that is complex in terms of the number of variables,'or constructs
as just shown; and one that is complex as a result of the CQm-
bination of elements. To give an example, the different kinds
and vast number of proteins would suggest that protein is a
complex phenomenon, yet in so far as it consists of different
combinations of only 22 different amino acids and that it is
sequence and number alone that determine the properties of the
protein it can be seen to be simple in the sense defined by Hayek.
He continues:
"It has occasionally been questioned whether the phenomena
of life, of mind, and of society are really more complex
than those of the physical world. This seems to be
largely due to a confusion between the degree of com-
plexity/••••
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plexity characteristic of a peculiar kind of phenome
non
and the degree of complexity to which, by a combina
tion of
elements, any kind of phenomenon can be built up. O
f
course, in this manner physical phenomena may achiev
e any
degree of complexity. Yet when we consider the ques
tion
from the angle of the minimum number of distinct var
iables
a formula or model must possess in order to reproduc
e the
characteristic patterns of structures of different f
ields
(or to exhibit the general laws which these structur
es
obey), the increasing complexity as we proceed from
the
inanimate to the ('more highly organised') animate a
nd
social phenomena becomes fairly obvious.
It is, indeed, surprising how simple in these terms,
i.e., in terms of the number cr distinct variables, appear
all the laws of Physics, and particularly of mechan
ics,
when.we look through a collectjoh of formulae expres
sing
them. On the other hand, even such relatively simple
constituents of biological phenomena as feedback (or
cybernetic) systems, in which a certain combination
of
physical structures produces an overall structure po
ssessing
distinct characteristic properties, require for thei
r
description something much more elaborate than anyth
ing
describing the general laws of mechanics. In fact,
when
we ask ourselves by what criteria we single out cert
ain
phenomena as "mechanical" of "physical" we shall pro
bably
find that these laws are simple in the sense defined
o
Non-physical phenomena are mo~ complex because we ca
ll
physical what can be described by relatively simple
formUlae".
(Hayek 1967 p25-26) (My emphasis.)
Hayek (1967) thus characterises sciences as essentia
lly simple
(in terms of the number of variables to be sonsidere
d) while the
arts and humanities are considered complex. One of
the major
reasons for the sciences being intersubjectively ve
rifiable is that




each being varied in its turn. This is not possible
in the arts
and humanities - there are too many variables: hence
the widespread
use of statistical interpretation.
If we accept this description of the arts as "comple
x" and
the sciences as "simple", and further, if we regard
cognitive
complexity as the willingness or ability to consider
a large number
of variables simultaneously, then it is reasohab~e t
o expect that
there will be a correlation between the individual's
level of
cognitive complexity and the area to which he is att
racted. We
must now, therefore, consider the question of a matc
h or "fit"
between the individual and his environillent.
37.
VIII INDIVIDUAL/ENVIRONMENT FIT
Pervin (1968), in discussing the relation between th
e individual
and his environment, concludes that
"For each individual there are environments that mor
e
or less match the characteristics of his personality
.
A ··match" or 'best fit' of the individual to environm
ent
is viewed as expressing itself in high performance,
satisfaction, and little stress in the system, where
as
'lack of fit' is viewed as resulting in decreased
performance, dissatisfaction, and stress in the syst
em."
(p56 )
An example of this is provided by Sapolsky (1965) wh
o has
demonstrated that therapist-patient compatability is
an important
determinant of therapeutic success. Schroder, Driver
and Streufert
(1967) use an information-processing model to predic
t the optimal
combination of environmental complexity and the inte
grative
complexity of the person, while Munsinger and Kessen
(1964) show
that an individual will "prefer environmental input
which is at
or near the limit of his ability to handle cognitive
uncert~inty"
(p21) and that "Human beings pre fer an amount of cog
nitve uncertain-
ty which matches their processing ability." (p2) Tuc
kman (1968)
has shown that factors correlating with maximum job
satisfaction
varies with different types of individuals, ranging
from job
security and structure for individuals having fairly
concrete
modes of thought, to factors such as social contact
and asteem
with more abstract indi'iduals.
Within the educational context, Claunch (1964) has s
hown
that cognitively abstract students perform significa
ntly'better




while there is no significant difference on a multip
le-choice
task. Similarly, Pohl and Pervin (1968) show t
hat cognitively
simple students do significantly better than cogniti
vely complex
people in Engineering, while the reverse relationshi
p holds for
students in the Social Sciences and Humanities.
Thus it would appear that the Humanities and the So
cial
Sciences, or what we have termed in this thesis the
arts, given
their weaker tendencies toward a cumulative, cohesiv
e structure,
their lack of a "paradigm", and their descriptive na
ture, offer
more opportunities for incongruity and contradiction
and demand
a greater degree of subjectivity and selection.
Within this
general framework of a "fit" between tJie individual
and his
environment, we should anticipate the results obtain
ed by Hudson
(1967, 1970) and credence is given to his arguement
(1970) that
"Convergers will tend to plump for those routes thro
ugh
the academic system in which the weight of accepted
authority is the greatest - Mathematics, Physical S
cience,
Classics; divergers, those in which this pressure is
least. What is alluring to the converger (and repu
gnant
to the diverger) about the exact disciplines is thei
r
exactitude. They are systems of thought from which
both muddle and emotion have been removed •••• while
for
the diverger, it is not only the emotional connotati
ons
o~ the arts.:that render them sri.attractive, but also
their imprecision." (p16)
If we now go beyond Hudson's view that it is the ind
ividual's
convergence or divergence that determines his area o
f interest
and invoke our characterisation ot divergers and convergers i
n




how a theory of a "fit" or match can account for the differential
preference for the arts or sciences by the divergers and the
convergers respectively. The structures of subject area and
cognitive apparatus can both be seen to vary along dimensions of
simplicity and complexity and we can therefore reasonably expect
the ,"simple" individuals to be drawn to "simple" tasks and the
"complex" individuals to ucomplex" tasks.
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IX THE HYPOTHESIS
In view of these arguments, it is thus hypothesised that:-
1) Scholars who are rated as cognitively complex will express
a preference for the arts subjects and cognitively simple
individuals will tend to prefer the sciences.
and
2) A "fit" between the individual and the requirements of the
task will manifest itself in a level of performance that is
higher than when this "fit" is lacking.
Thus it is predicted that simple individuals will prefer and
achieve higher in the sciences, while cognitively complex people
will prefer and achieve higher in the arts.
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X METHOD
The aim of this study, then, was to test the hypothesis
that there is a relationship between the individual's level of
integrative complexity and preference for the arts or science
subjects, and secondly to determine the effect, if any, of this
complexity on the level of achievement within these two subject area&.
In order to do this, a paragraph completion test designed by Harvey
(See e.g. 1966) was administered to 252 school boys in their final
(matriculation) year when the boys were in the region of seventeen
and eighteen years old. Intelligence measures were obtained from
school records and subject preference was obtained from each of
the boys. Performance measures in the form of matriculation
examination results were subsequently obtained for the sample from
the Natal Education Department at the end of the academic year.
This examination is a public school leaving and university entrance
examination held under the aegis of the State educational authority,
and as such provides as objective a criterion of academic perform-
ance as is possible in any educational system.
1 Sample
The sample (n=252) was drawn from seven of the nine state con-
trolled English-medium Boys' High Schools in the Durban, Natal area,
(i.e. no co-educational mixed senior/junior schools and no Afrikaans
or parallel-medium schools). As such the sample is fairly repres-
entative of all White English-speaking socio-economic levels in and
around Durban, although no attempt was made at an exact represent-
ation. If any bias is present, it is in the direction of over-
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representation by the lower S.E.S. levels. This could possibly
affect the proportions of the different complexity levels found
in the sample, although the proportions in this study do not
differ greatly from those reported elsewhere (e.g. Harvey et al
1966). Subjects were drawn from the top and middle ability
ranges in their school leaving (12
th
) year of school and were
group tested one class at a time (approx. 20 per class depending
on school and class). All subjects tested were from the Advanced
(A) Stream. (Until very recently pupils were graded at the sixth
grade level at + 13 years of age and assigned to to the A stream
which is an University entrance requirement, or to the Ordinary (0)
Stream, a more practically oriented, less academic course. About
7~~ of school children were assigned to the A-Stream.)
2 Scoring
In this study, Harvey's This-I-believe Test was used for
measuring cognitive complexity, although for obvious reasons not
all of the referents used by Harvey were considered appropriate
for use in local conditions - foe example, Harvey's measure of
ethnocentrism "the American way of life" has no ego-involving
counterpart in South Africa as a result of different social emphases
and socialisation patterns - at least as far as the English-speaking
sector is concerned. (South Africa's white population is approx-
imately 45% English-speaking and 55% Afrikaans-speaking. Social
patterns differ to a certain extent, with the English sector less
nationalistic in outlook and more liberal than the Afrikaans sec-
tor, with less emphasis on the obeijience of authority and on relig-
ous attendance and belief.) On the other hand, authority situations
are/••••
~ ego-involving as a result of educational and general social
climates in South Africa, and hence the referents used were
designed to tap these, as well as affiliation to group values.
The items used, in order of presentation, were ~, modern art,
religion, people, politicians, committing suicide, hippies and
telling lies. Instruction were identical to those used by Harvey.
Combined with the response booklet, and occuring before the
instructions, was a page on which the scholars were asked to indi-
cate their favourite, second favourite and least favoured subjects
studied at school. I.Q. scores, verbal, non-verbal and total,
were obtained from the scholars' record cards. In nearly all
instances, I.Q's had been measured within the lat three years and
most had used the New South African Group Test. Where two or
more sets of results were present, the highest set was taken.
Public Matriculation Examination results were obtained for
the majority of the sample.
Scoring was done "blind", i.e. each respone booklet was
numbered and scoring for complexity was done independent of any
knowledge of preference or intelligence level. Moreover, repons~
protocols from the various schools of different background and
S.E.S. level were randomised during scoring in order to exclude
or minimise the possibility of localised range distortion as a
result of large numbers of fairly similar results from one school
or S.E.S. level being scored consecutively.
a) Level of Cognitive Complexity
Scoring of; the responses for complexity was done in two ways.
Intially/••••
Initially an overall evaluation was done in line with Harvey's
theoretical framework and the individuals assigned to one of the
four systems. However it was found that scorer reliability was
fairly low (.50s) when response sheets were randomly retested by
inserted scored responses back into the pile being s oored. The
time factor involved in scoring 250 subjects probably accounts
for much of this variance, as well as the fact that this was
very early in the author's scoring history. Al though Greaves
(197la) reports reliabilities as high as .90, he does point out
that the semi-projective nature of the test does require thorough
familiarity with Conceptual Systems Theory and and a certain
amount of training.
As a result of the low reliability obtained, and in the absence
of any possibility of training, a second approach to the scoring
was instigated. Returning to the literature, four dimensions
were isolated in terms of which it was felt all systems could be
adequately characterised. Briefly these factors were:-
I Degree of absoluteness and evaluativeness shown in judgements.
11 Dependence on authority, i.e. adherence to group norms,
religious observance, etc.
III Need for structure or the tolerance of apparent disorder.
IV Positive or negative dependence of, and relation to, the
generalised "other".
These factors were weighted on a five point scale ranging from
+2 to -2 as a function of the intensity and direction of each of
the four dimensions. A return to the literature and to Harvey's
Table/••••
description of the characteristics which typify each of the four
systems (See e.g. Harvey and Felknor 1970) served to establish
typical "factor" profiles for each of the systems.
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From Table 1 it can thus be seen that a System 1 individual
will be highly absolute, evaluative and concrete in his thinking,
authority orientated and has a high need for order and for social
approval.
The System 2 person on the other hand, while he_ is a6
absolute and evaluative as the System 1 individual, rejects auth-
ority and is hostile and unco-operative, needing at the same time
a highly structured environment. The System 3 person can be seen
to be fairly relative in his jUdgements, but because of his need
for social approval - a need to be popular and to have friends -
he tends to relate to peer and group norms and to conform. His
cognitive structure does allow a certain degree of ambiguity to be
tolerated. The System 4 individual is relative in his judgements,
non-I••••
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non-evaluative and balanced in his decisions, though this independence
does sometimes make him appear unco-bperative and even hostile.
Response protocols were thus scored in terms of the relative
strength of these four factors and assigned to the four levels of
complexity by matching score profiles with those in Table 1.
Both Harvey (1966) and Greaves (1971) ad~it the possibility of
transition stages between each of these four systems, in that
an individual may perhaps be more complex in some cognitive
domains than in others. Greaves goes even further by suggesting
that, because of the strong negativity associated with System 2
responses, an individual can progress directly from System 1 to
System 3 and that as a result System'l/System 3 transitions are
possible. (In what follows, the following notation will be used:
the symbols !'£'2,i, will stand for Systems or levels 1, 2, 3,
4 respectively. Transitions will be designated thus: £-3 will
be a transition between levels 2 and 3 but nearer to £ than to
2. Similarly level 2-2 is also a transition between level 2 and
3, but nearer level 3 than level 2.) As a result, then, of
Harvey's and Greaves suggestions, the following thirteen systems
or transitions are possible: -1, !, 1-c, ~-l,~, ~-3, 2-2 , 2,
2-4 , i, and 1-3, 2-1. As a result of these considerations, the
original 4x4 matrix was expanded to yield an enlarged profile
system.
Table 2 Enlarged Profile System.
Table 2
"FACTOR"
~ 11 1:1:1 IV
-1 -2 -2 -2 -2
1 -2 -2 -2 -1
1-2 -2 -1 -2 -1
2-1 -2 +1 -2 +1
2 -2 +2 -2 +2
L 2-3 -1 +1 -1 +1
E
V
E 3-2 0 -1 0 -1
3 +1 -1 +1 -2
L
















Individuals were then scored in terms of these 4 'factors'
and assigned on the basis of their factor profile to one of these
13 levels on the basis of best fit. Using this method a scorer
reliability approaching .90 was achieved, which in comparison with
the/ ••••
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the low .50 obtained initially made this long{r method seem
more desirable. In addition, a correlation of .75 was found
between this and the more usual scoring method.
Scoring, as we noted above, was done blind, each response
protocol being assigned a code number and all information being
entered onto a master sheet. Scoring was done entirely by the
author, though a relatively small (n=~50) was retested by a
colleague, yielding an interscorer reliability of .43. In the
light of the fact that this colleague was the only person with
conceptual systems theory experience in the department meant that
he alone Was able to assist, even though he had never rated
subjects previously. Thus it is felt that the tester reliability
of .90 achieved during "blind" retesting is perhaps more im-
portant than the intertester reliability of .43.
It was felt, however, that the descrimination of individuals
into thirteen levels is finer than the investigation warrants
(or accuracy permits?) and so these thirteen levels were reduced
to six as shown in ascending order of complexity in Table 3.
Table 3 Six Levels of Complexity Used.
49.





3 ~-l, ,g, ,g-3
4 2-1 , 2-2
5 2' 2-4
6 ~-3, 4
As can be seen from Table 3, these six levels are roughly
equivalent to Harvey's four conceptual levels with the intermediary
or "nodal" levels ];-2, ];-3 forming one new level and 2-2, 2-1
forming the other transitory group.
In order to understand how transition levels between levels
1 and 3 are possible while yet keeping the linearity of complexity,
we refer now to Diagrams 1 and 2










Note that although transition levels between "neighbouring"
levels are possible, transitions between levels 1 and 3 are ruled
out. If we agree with Greaves (1971) that the strong negativity
displayed by the System 2 individual in hi. social and interpersonal
relationships is not a necessary stage in the evolution of a complex
cognitivel• •••
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cognitive structure, t~n Diagram 1 is not adequate. Diagram
2 shows how the 1-3 transitions are possible, while maintaining
linearity.




------ Increasing Complexity ,
I
Note that 1-3 transitions are now possible, while the over-
all linearity is preserved.
Diagram 3 shows the structural levels used in this study.
(See Table 3.)













Using this method, the responses of the sample of 25
2 school-
boys were rated and the individuals assigned to one
of the six
complexity levels. From Table 3 and Diagram 3 it can be seen
that the levels 1, 2 and 3 as used by this author are assosc
iated
with systems 1 and 2 of Harvey, while levels 4, 5 and 6 are
essentially the same as Harvey's Systems 3 and 4. On the basis
of this equation, levels 1, 2 and 3, as used in this study,
will
be regarded as cognitively simple, and levels 4, 5 and 6 will be
regarded as cognitivelY compl~x.
b) Measures of Preference.
In order to quantify subject preference configuratio
ns along
an arts/science continuum for. the purposes of corre
lation, the
following scheme was adopted:
Arts subjects (which following Hudson 1967, were Lit
erature,
Modern Languages, History and the Graphic Arts) were
given a
weighting of +2 when they appeared as subject most f
avoured, a
weighting of +1 when they were given as second most
favoured, and
-2 when they were chosen as the subject least favour
ed.
Science subjects (among which Hudson lists Physics,
Chemistry,
Mathematics, Physical Science and note Latin) were l
oaded in the
opposite direction: -2 when they were given as most
favoured {IF),
-1 when given as second favourite subject (2F), and
+2 when given
as least favoured subject (LF).
Subjects that were strictly neither arts nor science
subjects
(e.g. commercial subjects, geometrical or technical
drawing, and
note biology) were scored O.
Totalling/••••
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Totalling these loadings yielded a score spr.ead from +5 -
i.e. with an arts subject most preferred, an arts subject second
most favoured, and a science subject least preferred +2 +1 +2 -
to -5 (IF = science, 2F = science and LF = arts -2 -1 -2). This
spread was then ranked from 1 to 11, reflecting a decrease in arts
preference and a corresponding increase in science orientation.
This is shown in Table 4
Table 4 Calculation of Preference
IF 2F LF SCORE RANK
A A S +2~1+2 = 5 1
A 0 S +2 0+2 = 4 2
A A G +2+1-0 = 3 3
A 0 A +2 0-2 = 0
) )0 0 0 0 o 0 = 0 6
S 0 S -2 0+2 0
)
=
S S 0 -2-1 0 =-3 9
S 0 A -2 0-2 =-4 10
S S S -2-1-2 =-5 11
It can be seen from this table that it is assumed that a preference
for one or other type of sybject implies a non-preference for the
alternative. Theoretically this is predicted by the individual/
environment "fit" model. Analysis of experimental data from
this study serves to justify this assumption. An inspection of
Tables 5 and 6 below shows a significant X2 in the assumed
direction for both the cognitively simple and the complex groups,
although this would seem to be more true of the simple than the
complex.
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c) Measures of Achievement
As indicated above, achievement measures for the sam
ple were
in the form of results from the public matriculation
examination.
Results were obtained from the Natal Education Depar
tment and
consisted of the marks obtained by the scholars in e
ach of their
six or seven examination subjects. In all cases th
ese marks
are out of a maximum of 300, the only exception bein
g the pupil's
main language which is marked out of 400. (Both of
ficial lang-
uages, English and Afrikaans are compulsory for all
pupils through-
out school, although at different levels.) For the
purpose of
direct comparison of these results, the main languag
e (for the
sample this was English) marks were reduced pro rata
to bring
them into line with the maximum in other subjects, i
.e. 300.
Means were calculated for the arts and science group
s of
subjects. In most cases at least two subjects in e
ach group
were used, often more. In only two or three cases
was only one
science or art subject mark available.
XI RESULTe
1 Pre ference
Before we consider the major hypothesis, it is perha
ps nec-
essary to evaluate the scoring procedure, especially
with regard
to the preference data. Under Scoring above, it Was
assumed that
a preference for one subject area implied a non-pref
erence of the
alternative arts or science, i.e. to be arts orienta
ted meant
that an arts subject was given as both favoured and
second favoured
subject and science given as least favoured. It is
necessary to
explore this assumption for if it is invalid, any re
sults obtained
using the preference data will be an artefact.
An analysis of the response protocols yielded data w
hich are
eummarised in Tables 5, 6, 7 and 8.
Table 5 Subject Preferences of the Cognitively Si
mple
(1) (2) ( 3) (4)
Most Second Either Least
Favoured Favouri te IF or Favoured
IF 2F 2F LF
Science 56 71 98 47
Arts 30 41 60 88
Using data from columns IF, 2F and _LF, ( (1);(2)&(4)
J)
X
2 = 11.28 which is significant (p < .005 2 df). Using data from
(3) and LF (4)
2
(p < .001 1 d f) 0columns IF or 2F X = 21.17
It can thus be seen in Table 5 that for the cognitiv
ely simple
individuals (n = 150) there is a highly significant tendency for
the/••••
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the sciences to be preferred and for the arts to be
least
preferred.
Table 6 shows a similar relationship with the cogni
tively
complex.
Table 6 Subject Preferences of the Cognitively Com
plex
(1 ) (2) <3) (4)
Most Second Either Least
Favoured Favourite IF or Favoured
IF 2F 2F LF
Science 31 28 46 48
Arts 46 58 76 45
Using data from columns IF, 2F and ~ (cols 1,2,4), X
2 = 6.78




4 ( )= .17 p < .05 1 df •
Thus, although the data in Table 6 are significant,
this is
at the lower .05 level. This arises, it can be argu
ed, from the
fact that the complex scholars show a preference for
the arts
but non-preference for the arts and the sciences is
about equal.
This Can be supported on theoretical grounds if we a
rgue that for
the cognitively simple individuals, preference and n
on-preference
will be directly related, while with the complex per
sons this
relationship will be confounded by other factors.
From Tables 5 and 6 it can be seen that the assumpti
on that




other is supported. Note however the proviso that t
fiis appears
to be more characteristic of the cognitively simple
than it does of
the complex. Because the data in Tables 5 and 6 are for the
most part significant at the .05 level, it will be n
ecessary
to treat the preference scores with caution and we m
ust there-
fore look at the hypotheses of this st~dy in terms o
f preference
for individual subjects as well as in terms of prefe
rence scores.
Bearing in mind the limitations ju~t noted, we must
now
evaluate the hypothesis that subject preference is r
elated to
structural complexity, and that an increase in arts
orientation
is correlated with an increase in complexity.
a) Firstly, combining data from Tables 5 and 6 yields
Table 7
in which the differential preference for the two dif
ferent domains
of knowledge by the cognitively simple and complex i
ndividuals
is shown.
Table 7 Differential Preference by. Simple and Complex Person
s
Subject given Simple Complex
as lF and/or 2F
Science 98 46
Arts 60 76
x2 = 15.34 (p< .001 1 df)














x2 :: 6.00 (p~ .02 1 df)
From Tables 7 and 8 it can be seen that the predicted
re-
lationship is still evident, and it would appear tha
t the quant-
ification of the preference data has not introduced
any artefacts
into the study.
~) Correlation of preference score (ranging from 1
to 11, arts
to science) with complexity score (ranging from 1 to
6, simple
to complex) yields a significant product-moment (r ::
-.2133,
p," cOl 251 df). The effect of intelligence (which c
orrelates
02848 with preference and .1676 with complexity) serv
es to reduce
the correlation. By partialling out the effects of
intelligence
(using formula





the magnitude of the correlation was increased to .27
87 which is
significant beyond .001 (251 df).
c) Sorting the data in terms of complexity and prefe
rence into
a 2 X 3 matrix (2 complexity, 3 preference) yielded a high
ly
significant chi-square. This is given in Table 9.
Table 9/....
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Table 9 Preference vs Complexity
Cog. Simple Cog. Complex n
1 - 3 4 - 6
Arts Pref.
1 - 3 24 40
64
'Mixed' Pref.
4 - 8 55 34 89
Science Pref.
9 - 11 71 28 99
n 150 102 252
x2 = 19.19 (p<.OOl 2 df)
At this point the results of the public matriculatio
n and
school-leaving examination written by the pupils, th
e Natal
Senior Certificate Examination were obtained for 226
of the
original sample of 252 - the remaining 26 no having
written, or
having written at the more practical "Oil-level. Fr om
this point
on, therefore, the analysis and discussion of the da
ta will be
confined to this smaller sample.
Analysis of the smaller sample in terms of complexit
y and
preference yielded, as would be expected, results ve
ry similar
to those in Table 9.
Table 10/••••
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Table 10 Complexity x Preference (Reduced Sample)
Cog. Simple Cog. Complex n
1 - 3 4 - 6
Arts Pre f
1 - 3 21 34 55
''Mixed''
Pref 4 - 8 45 34 79
Science
Pref 9 - 11 67 25 92
n 133 93 226
X
2
= 18.93 (p <0 001 2 d f)
Thus it is felt that the first part of the hypothesi
s has
been supported by the data and that satisfaction as
expressed
by preference for a certain type of material relates
to
characteristics of the individuals cognitive structu
re. More
specifically, it is felt that the data supports the
contention
that cognitively simple individuals are drawn to the
sciences
and that the complex individuals prefer the arts.
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11 Performance
As noted above, the results of 226 of the original 252 subjects
were obtained f~om the matriculation examination written at the
end of 1972. The examination was the Natal Senior Certificate,
a public examination written under the auspices of the Natal
Education Department.-
In this examination all candidates are required to take the
two languages English and Afrikaans, one as a home language and
the other as a second language. For this sample the home language
Was English. In addition to these two languages, at least one of
the sciences is compulsory. The balance of the six (sometimes
seven) examination subjects is constructed in mOBt~combinations
from the whole range of arts, science and "other" subjects as
described above depending on school and course chosen. All subjects
have a maximum of 300 marks, except the home language which has
a maximum of 400. Mean arts and science marks were calculated
for the sample, and expressed as a score -based on a maximum of
300. For this purpose the English mark was reduced pro rata-to
300.
-The author expresses his thanks to Dr Rosking and
the Natal Education Department for making these
results available.
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In looking at the examination results of the sample, it was
apparent that, although mean arts and science marks did not
differ significantly, the variances of the two sets of marks were
diffent with the science marks extending some 10% or 30 marks
beyond those of the arts at both ends of the scale. Distribution
characteristics are tabled in Table 11.










A comparison of these variances yielded a t:10.05 which is
significant at the .001 level. (For the use of the t-test here,
see Bruning and K1intz 1968 p109.)
Note also the negative skewness of the science distribution as
evidenced by the discrepancies between mean, median and mode.
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i Achievement and Complexity
The 4ypothesis to be tested here is that, as a r~sult of a
match or " fit" between the individual and the task, achievement
level in the two subject domains will vary as a function of the
individual's complexity level. More specifically, it predicted
that the cognitively complex will achieve higher than the simple
in the arts, but that the cognitively simple would perform better
in the sciences. Tables 12 and 13 analyses these predictions.
Table.12' Achievement x Complexity
Simple Complex t Sig
Art Mark 161.03 172.39 3.48 .001
Science Mark 156.88 161.51 0.94 NIs
n 133 93
In order compare the data with a later table, deviations
about the two means were calculated, yielding Table 13.












Tables 12 and 13 show that the second part of the hypothesis
is supported to a certain extent - a~ predicted, complex individuals
score significantly higher than simple individuals in the arts subjects.
ForI ..·..
For science achievement, however, level of complexity makes no
significant difference, i.e. the complex individual does as well
as the simple one. This is, of course, counter to the hypothesis.
The evidence sU6gests that in the complex arts task, the level
of complexity of the individual is an important determinant of
success, whereas in the sciences, the simple and the complex
achieve equally well. In other w0rds, the complex individual is
equally at home i.n':both complex and simple tasks (though he may
prefer the more complex situation - See Tables 9 and 10) while
the simple person both prefers and achieves higher in the sciences -
a simple task.
This would seem to be an important modification. of the
hypothesis. However, because of the different natures of the
distributions of the two sets of marks (Table 11), it is felt
that the results in Tables 12 and 13 should be treated with caution
and that particUlar account should be taken of the possible role
of intelligence in these results. In order to minimise any effect
of intelligence all marks, arts and science, were adjusted by the
degree to which they correlated with LQ. - Le ••'5&8 for science
and .497 for arts.
Results of this adjustment are shown in Table 14 and should
be compared directly with Table 13.













Although variances were not calculated on this data and hence
no t-test could be carried out, a similar pattern to that in
Table 12 emerges. Visual inspection would suggest that the arts
marks differ significantly while the science marks do not. Note
that this I.Q. adjustment does not affect the the dominance of
the complex group in the arts subjects but that it is reversed in
the case of the science marks. Although this does not appear
to be a significant result, it does point to the differential
contribution of the I.Q. to the achievement level in the two
subject domains - a point discussed in more detail below.
On the basis of the results just presented, it is felt that
the second part of the hypothesis is supported and that a "fit"
between the individual's cognitive characteristics and the demands
of the task results in a raised level of achievement. The data
do, however, suggest that while cognitively simple individuals
achieve highest in the simple tasks, the complex individual copes
equally well in the simple and complex tasks - an important
modification to the hypothesis. Although the concept of a "fit"
remains important, the data would suggest that while simple
individuals are "fitted" to the simple tasks, complex people are
"fitted" to both types of task, the simple and the complex.
It may perhaps be argued that this interpretation of the data
is value-laden in that it suggests the superiority of the compl~x
. person who is equally at home in the simple and complex tasks
over the individual who is simple and whose success is limited to
simple/••••
simple tasks. An alternative construction of these
results
would be to deny the generality of the individual's
complexity
across all cognitive domains and to argue with Bieri
(1961)
that complexity refers solely to social situations.
The argument
would continue that the arts, as defined here encom
passing the
humanities, literature etc. are obviously concerned
with social
situations and that therefore performance and prefer
ence would
naturally be a '. function of measured complexity. Th
e sciences,
on the other hand, would be relatively independent o
f this social
complexity, and would perhaps be more closely relate
d to intellect-
ual ability. Credence is given to this view by An
derson, Gardiner
and Flathman (In press) who demonstrate independent
factors of
interpersonal and intellective complexity. Howeve
r, while Bieri
et al (1966), Allard and Carlson (1963), .Signell (1966), and
others have all reported or argued for domain specif
icity with
regard to complexity, Scott (1963), Crockett (1965) and Bannis
ter
and Mair (1968) argue for generality of complexity across all
cognitive domains. Thus, although certain evidence
for this sec-
ond interpretation of the data is available, the iss
ue is far
from decided. However, the construction·of these f
indings first
put forward is supported by analogy to findings repo
rted by
Bernstein (e.g. 1971) with regard to the use of different lang
-
uage codes. Bernstein argues that individuals or gro
ups of
individuals differ in the language registers they ha
ve available,
some habitually using a structurally simple or "rest
ricted" lang-
uage code, while others use a grammatically and logi
cally more
complex, or '_'elaborated", code. Of interest here i
s the fact
that individuals who possess only the "restricted" l
anguage can




ing the "elaborated" language code, on the other hand, respond
equally well to "restricted" and "elaborated" codes.
"Children socialsied within middle-class and associated
strata can be expected to possess both an elaborated and
a restricted code, whilst children socialised within some
sections of the working-class strata, particularly the
lower working-class, can be expected to be limited to a
restricted code." (Bernstein 1971 p136 Original emphasis)
Cazden (1966) in analysing a study by Cherry (1964) notes that
"while lower-class fifth graders had more trouble under-
standing middle-class peer speech than that of their own
group, the decreased comprehension across social class
lines was not reciprocal. The middle- class children
understood lower-class peer speech as well as did the
lower-class children." (p188 My emphasis)
Although one cannot move very easily from linguistic to cognitive
structures, this is not in fact being attempted here. What is being
suggested is merely that the complex necessarily incorporates the
simple and that the ability to deal with the complex,presupposes the
ability (if not the desire) to deal with the simple, while the
ability to deal with the simple does not entail the ability to deal
with the complex (even where the desire is present). Bernstein
(1971), Cazden (1966) and Cherry (1964) all show this to be true for
language skills and we believe this is as true for cognitive func-
tioning. Thus it is argued that the complex individual is com-
pe tent to deal with both complex and simple phenomena, whereas the
cognitively simple individual is limited to simple phenomena.
This we believe is the meaning of the data in Tables 12, 13 and 14.
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ii Relative Performance
In order to explore the effects of complexity a little further
it was decided to examine the relation of cognitive complexity to
achievement attained in one subject area relative to the other,
independent of the actual level obtained by the individual. In
other words, the contribution of complexity to the direction or
bias of perform~nce must be examined. To accomplish this, the
sample Was divided into three groups on the basis of their relative
performance, i.e. into an arts performance group in which arts
achievement was greater then that in the sciences; a "mixed" per-
formance group in which arts and science achievement was equal;
and a science performance group in which science achievement was
superior.
As a result of the different characteristics of the two mark
distributions (Table 11), direct comparison of the two sets of
results was, however, virtually impossible. Therefore, in order
to effect the analysis, each set of results was divided into a
number of steps, comparison taking place across steps rather than
individually. This was done in two ways, neither of which
yielded significant results.
a) Segmentation of Score Ranges
Firstly, the two score ranges were segmented into fifteen equal
steps and individual marks were assigned to one of these steps.
Relative performance in the arts direction was interpreted as the
arts mark being one complete step greater than the science mark,
and vice versa for the science group.
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Marks within one step of each
other/••••
other were assigned to the "mixed" performance group. Analysis
of the distribution of these three performance groups in terms of
their measured complexity or simplicity yields Table 15.












This distribution is not significant using chi-squared.
b) Segmentation of Sample
Because of the non-significance of Table 15, a second approach
was used, dividing the sample into fifteen equal units. Once
again individual arts and science marks were assigned to one of
these units and relative performance calculated.
second method, Table 16 was obtained.
Using this












Once again, a chi-squared analysis proved non-significant,
though a simple exclusion of the mixed performance category was
significant at the .05 level (ldf). Little inportance Can
bel• •••
be attached to this statistic, however.
On the basis of Tables 15 and 16 we are forced to conclude
that relative performance is unrelated to the individual's level
of complexity
Why this should be so is puzzling, especially in the light
of the absolute differences shown in Table 12. However, an
inspection of Tables 15 and 16 suggests that the lack of sig-
nificance can be most attributed to the large number of "simple"
individuals who achieve highly in the arts relative to the sciences.
When we look at the I.~. figures (Tables 20 and 22 below) we
see that this group has the lowest measured intelligence. It is
therefore suggested that in the lower ability ranges of the sample
success is greater in the arts than in the sciences. Given the
looser structure of the arts and the greater subjectivity of
assessment, it can argued that pupils of lower intellectual ability
would tend to do better in the arts than in the sciences. This is
borne out by the negative skewness of the science mark distribution
and the higher minimum mark in the arts. (See Table 11.)
i1i Preference and Performance
In view of the strong relationship between complexity and
subject preference reported in Tables 9 and 10, it is of interest
at this stage to examine the relation between expressed preference
and academic achievement, with repect to both.·level and direction
of achievement. As expleined above under Scoring, preference deter-
mination was based on the configuration of responses given to
questions/••••
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questions asking for favourite, second favoured, and
least favoured
school subjects. Responses were ranked from 1 to
11 as they
moved from an arts to a science orientation. Sub
je cts ranked
1 - 3 are, for the purposes of this study, deemed arts pre
ferrers,
from 4 - 8 as having "mixed" preference and 9 - 11 as having a
science preference.
a) Preference and Level of Achievement
The differential effect of preference on achievement
level is
shown in Table 17 and Graph 1.















The data from Table 17 are presented graphically in
Graph 1,
expressed as score deviation about the two means.



















Note the relatively low gradient of the arts marks a
nd the
strong positive relationship between science prefere
nce and
science achievement. This would suggest that suc
cess is a major
determinant of satisfaction in the sciences. Th
is is supported
by a correlation of .494 between preference score and science
mark, but only of .189 with arts mark. In order to exclude any
distorting effects of intelligence variables, the ma
rks were
adjusted by their correlation with I.Q .• This yiel
ded a result
very similar to that in Graph 1, the only difference
being a small
decrease in score range. This data is presented
in Graph 2.































b) The Relation of Preference to Performance Directi
on
It is easy to predict a strong relationship between
preference
and performance - indeed it would be surprising to f
ind that people
did not enjoy what they were good at. This was fou
nd to be the
case in this study. A 3 (preference) x 3 (performance) tabl
e




Table 18 Preference X Performance+
Arts Mixed Science
Per formance Performance Per formance
Arts Pre ference 28 19
8
Mixed Preference 25 32
22
Science Preference 14 33
45
X2 = 27.81 Sig .001 4df
+Direction of Performance by sample segmentation met
hod.
In accounting for this relationship between performa
nce and
preference, two outlooks are possible. Firs
tly, it can be argued
that preference for a certain subject area will incr
ease involve-
ment, motivation, etc. culminating in a higher level
of achievement.
The problem the remains of accounting for the initia
l preference.
Alternatively, it may be that satisfaction results f
rom the level
of success generally achieved in the task, i.e. one
prefers the
subject because one does well in it, rather than the
reverse.
This second view, when applied to the preference fin
dings,
gives support to the idea that the scientist is esse
ntially simple
in cognitive structure - preference for the sciences
is directly
related to level of achievement, while for the arts,
factors
other than success contribute to satisfaction - a mo
re complex
situation. (Recall also the preference data discusse
d above (p 56)
which suggested that the simple individual's prefere
nce and non-
preferenece are strongly related, while this trend w
as less marked
in the complex group.~ Furthemore, because of the na
ture of the two
subject areas, progress in the sciences is more read
ily perceived
(the "rungs of the ladder" are more easily seen to h
ave been climbed -
cf./••••
73.
cf. Hajnal 1972 above). This greater feedback may b
e one of the
factors contributing to the level of satisfaction ex
perienced.
It can be further argued that the cognitively simple
would be
more dependent on this immediate feedback than the c
omplex
person. This view is supported by Stuempfig and Ma
ehr (1970),
who show that complexity level and type of feedback
has a marked
effect on task persistence. In particular, they sho
w that conrete
(simple) subjects respond (by persisting st the task)
to a greater
extent in a situation were feedback is present.
For the abstract
(complex) subjects, the type of feedback appears to h
ave little
effect on persistence. It is not difficult to argu
e a relation-
ship between persistence and satisfaction or preferen
ce.
Finally, evidence for this differential role of prefe
rence in
the two subject areas is provided when we include the
preference
data in a polynomial regression for the prediction o
f arts and
science marks. In the case of the science marks, pr
edictability
of achievement, Level. based solely on I.Q. data is .588, increasin
g
to .675 on the inclusion of preference data. With th
e arts
achievement, on the other hand, the regression co-ef
ficient increase
from .502 to .507 when preference data is included in
the calculation.
All the evidence thus suggests that the individual's
expressed
preference is far more closely related to his succes
s in the
sciences than in the arts.
We have yet to look at the inter-relationship of int
elligence
level with the parameters we have been discussing in
determining
scholastic achievements. I.Q. measures verbal, non-
verbal and total




record cards of each member of the sample.
iv The Role of Intelligence.
As we have already seen, the single-most iaportant d
eterminant
of achievement level is general ability or intelligen
ce which
in this study correlates .497 with arts and .588 with
science
mark, (using Total I.Q.) This is within the limits
reported by
other researchers e.g. Oattell, Barton and Dielman (1
972). Further
analysis of preference and performance data in terms
of I.Q. and
complexity, yield Tables 19 and 20.























-Direction of achievement - sample segmentation
method (See above p69)
From these tables it would appear that I.Q. increases with
complexity and with science orientation. This is su
pported by
significant correlations between I.Q. and preference
(r =".3117





A breakdown of these Tables into Verbal and Non-verb
ai I.Q.
components yields Tables 21 and 22.
Table 21 Preference, 1.Q. (Verbal and Non-verbal) and
Complexity
Simple Complex
VIQ NV1Q VIQ NVIQ
Arts Preference 112 110 113 112
Mixed Preference 113 118 119 12
0
Science ?reference 116 121 127 129
Table 22 Performance-, 1.Q. (Verbal and Non-verbal) a
nd Complexity
Simple Complex _
V1Q NVIQ. V1Q. NVIQ
Arts Performance 113 115 119 11
4
Mixed Performance 114 120 118 122
Science Performance 114 120 120 123
·Direction of performance by sample segmentation
method. (See above p69)
The correlation of these I.Q.. components with prefere
nce,
complexity and achievement is shown in Table 23.
Table/23/••••
Table 23 Correlation of 1.9. with Preference and Complexity
VIQ NV1Q T1Q
Preference
(for science) .2289· .3543· .3117 •





·Sig. .001 +S· .01J.g.
Although the inter-relationships between these different
measures are fairly complex, three principles would seem
to emerge
from Tables 19 - 23.
1. Higher absolute I.Q. relates to science orientation
- as far
as both preference and performance are concerned. Two
poss-
ible reasons for this come to mind. Firstly, that the
sciences attract the more intellectually able student.
Sec-
ondly, as suggested by Hudson (1967, 1970), those cognitive
styles most tapped by the I.Q. tests are the ones favoure
d by
the science-oriented student - i.e. convergent thinking.
£. Relative I.Q. (i.e. the superiority of verbal or non-verbal
component determines orientation - verbal I.Q. relating
to arts
and non-verbal to sciences. Taken in conjunction wit
h 1. above,
this would suggest that a low non-verbal ability results
in a
dislike of the sciences and the ?rts are thus preferred
by
"default". (c.L Table 11 where minimum science mark is 10%




self-image and greater exp
erience of "success" in the
arts and
it is this which leads to
the greater preference.)
2' Complexity relates to verbal I.Q••
This would suggest that
the complexity measure tap
s some verbal factor, altho
ugh
Bieri (1961 p359) report.
no significant relationship
between
cognitive complexity and v
erbal intelligence while S
chroder
et al. (1967) show that as
sessment of intergrative c
omplexity
does not appear to be cont
aminated be verbal fluency
as measured
by length of sentence com
pletions. On the other han
d, as
argued above, linguistic a
nd cognitive structures ha
ve elements
of similarity and probably
derive from similar social
and
cultural sources. Therefo
re we would expect a certa
in degree
of correlation. Further r
esearch into the commonal
ities of
these two areas would be r
evealing.
The interaction of these t
hree principles in the det
ermination
of ~rea of ability is show
n in Table 24.
Table 24 I~Q. in Relation
to Other Parameters.
LQ. Conceptua











Although this is an over s
implification, it would see
m to be
a reasonable summary of th
e findings in relation to
I.Q. factors.
78.
XII SUMMARY AND IMPLICAT~_
uNS.
In summary then, this pape
r set out to demonstrate th
at as a
result of a "fit" between
task requirements and indiv
idual cognitive
characteristics, individua
ls judged as cognitively co
mplex would
both prefer and achieve hi
gher in the arts subjects
while the
cognitively simple individ
uals would be oriented tow
ards the
sciences. Cognitively com
plex i'ndividuals were show
n to have
wider ranging interests an
d information processing a
bilities
than vthe simpleiindividuals
:- and that the arts were
more complex
than the sciences in terms
of the number of variables
acting in
anyone situation. This w
as seen to be related to. th
e presence
or absence of a "paradigm"
in Kuhn's (1962) sense of
the word.
It was finally ar:gued that
the result of a "fi~' or "m
atch" between
task and performer charact
eristics would result in an
expres~ion
of satisfaction or preferen
ce and in a higher level o
f performance.
The data presented above w
as interpreted as showing q
uite
unequivocably a relationsh
ip between structural com
plexity and
preference. Tables 7, 9 and 10
all yielded chi-squared va
lues
significant beyond the .00
1 level and a correlation
between pref-
erence and complexity thou
gh low was also significan
t at this lev~
Achievement in the sampl~s
school leaving examination
showed that
while arts mark idiffered s
ignificantly wjth level of
complexity,
tbe science marks were not
thus affected. This was in
terpreted
as illustrating the ability
of the complex individual
to succeed
in both simple and complex
tasks(though perhaps prefe
rring the
complex) while the simple




tasks. I.Q. figures show an increasinc science orie
ntation wjth
increasing ability, either because of the higher int
ellectual
demands made by the scienoes, or as Hudson (1967, 1970) sugges
ts,
because 1. Q. tests favour those modes ,f thinking tha
t are




To summarise these results, the data of this study s
uggest:
1. Performance in academic subjects is for the largest
part dependent
on intellectual ability.
~) This is more true for the sciences than the arts
.
b) This results perhaps from a "scien tific" de finit
ion of int-
elligence and the construction of Lntelligenc81testa
which tap
those cognitive abilities important in the sciences.
2. Achievement in the arts depends to a certain deg
ree on' the
complexity of the individual's cognitive structure.
Science
achievement is relatively independent of cognitive c
omplezity.
a) This suggests that achievement in the~complex in
cludes ach-
ievement in the simple, while the reverse i. not tru
e.
Linguistic parallels exist.
2. Performance in the sciences is closely related to stated
preference. In the arts this is not the case.
a) This may be a function of feedback and "knowledg
e of results ".
4. Preference is determined by cognitive complexity, scien
ce




a) Hence feedback will be more jmportant fo ..' .. '" (sil!1p~'9)
scientist. (3A)
20 Intelligence components (verbal and non-verbal)relat~ d~;­
ferentially to arts and science performance •
a) Where both I.~. components are low, arts are preferred - by
"default" it is suggested; i.e. failure in the arts is not
so marked as in the sciences. (6. Below)
b) Rela'ively hjgh verbal I.~. relates to arts achievement und
pre ;'orence, hi gh non-verbal I. '.' t, sc'ience .(;rne nel t. !ll
prpf·rf".;e.
c) \Vhere both I.~. components are equally high, science is
preferred.
d) This suggests that the arts are preferred when non-verbal
LQ. is low.
6. The nature of the distributions of the two sets of marks and
the significantly greater variance of the science marks sugg~
that both success and failure are easier to achieve or seen
to be achieved, in the sciences than in the arts.
a) Hence the findings in 2 a), ~ a), 2 a) and c).
Z. Thus the picture emerges of two groups of individual's.
a) Firstly, the low ability individual who does not achieve
very highly in academic subjects. However because of the
structure of the arts he tends to achieve more highly in
these subjects than in~the sciences, where greater emphasis
is on knowledge of specifics. Despite this higher arts
achievement, he may well prefer the sciences.
b) / ••••
81.
b) Se condly, there is a group of individual's of medium to
high intellectual ability. For these, achievement would
appear to depend on complexity, the simpler individual's
preferring and achieving in the sciences and the more complex
individual's preferring the arts, but achieving equally
well in both arts and sciences, I.Q. components becoming
important, a dominance of the verbal component tending to
push the individual into the arts, while a non-verbal
dominance leading to the sciences.
If the data presented by this sample is truly characteristic
of the population and if it is correctly interpreted, two things
become apparent.
Firstly, by increasing level of complexity beyond a certain
level, educationalist3 may be runninE; the risk of "converting"
many potential natural scientists away from the hardcore sciences
- Physics, Chemistry, Mathematics, etc - in the direction of the
humanities and arts, probably in fact into the social and biological
sciences. This mayor may not be a socially desirable development.
However one shou1d be aware of the fact that, while current
educational theory of "creative freedom" in schools may enhance the
creative potential and originality of the scientists it produces,
theEe is an accompanying risk that fewer scientists will emerge
and that those who do will be less "hardcore" in their outlook.
Perhaps it is for this reason that a trend away from the sciences
to the humanities and social sciences is discernible in numerous
Universities. (See for example a report on Sussex University -
Times/••••
82.
Times Educational Supplement 16.3.73 p6)
~ second asp~et of these findings is the fteed to tak
e into
account in the educational situation the demands and
characteristics
of the pujils, the teachers and the material being t
aught.
Hirst (1969), for example, argues that;
"The internal logical characteristics of the distinc
t forms
of knowledge and their relationships to each other,
are
likely to contain important principles that should g
overn the
teaching of these areas."
While recent research has concerned itself with the
matching
of teacher and pupil in their educative interaetion,
this study
suggests the neccessity of matching teaching method
and material
being taught. Several studies (e.g. Behr 1967, Davi
s 1967,
Dougherty 1967) all suggest that in teaching mathem
atical ideas
and operations, there is merit in matching the model
of instruction
with the speetal aptitudes of the students. Hunt an
d Hardt (1967)
show that structured, highly organised programs are
more effective
for students of low conceptual level, whereas flexib
le approaches
allowing high student autonomy produce greater gains
for students
of high conceptual level.
These studies and the findings reported above would
therefore
seem to suggest the neccessity of adopting different
teaching
strategies for the arts and the sciences, and that t
hese would have
to vary as a function of the complexity level of the s
cholars. This
is in fact probably done intuitively by most teacher
s but could
be a fruitful area for future research. It is thus
important to
determine the interaction of teacher characteristics
, teaching
method/ ••••
method, subject characteristics and student conceptu
al level in
order to maximise learning. Nor is it a simple matte
r of placing
the pupil in a learning environment that is most con
gruent with
his existing personality and cognitive structure, fo
r as Harvey,
Hunt and Schroder (1961) warn, ~uch procedures simpl
y promote
arrestation and thereby defeat the process of growth
and progress
which should be a major goal of education. (p340)
The teacher is thus caught in a dilemma of having to
capital-
ise in his teaching on existing aptitude and cogniti
ve patterns
while at the same time trying to modify that pattern
and ensuring
that arrestation o£ growth does not occur. According to Muns
inger
and Kessen (1964) this growth is beat achieved whent
bhe material
to be learned lies at the limit of his ability to de
al with it, -
less than this results in boredom, beyond this resul
ts in
fr-ustration.
"A person will moat prefer environmental inp~t which
is at
or near the limit of his ability to handl, cognitive
un-
certainty•••••• A stimulus containing markedly more c
ognitive
uncertainty than SI S capacity, however novel it may
be when
defined against his experience, will not be preferre
d to
less novel but capacity matching stimulation." (p 2
1)
Therefore in~order to ensure the cognitive growth th
at is
the aim of education, the characteristics of the pup
il, the
teacher, the subject being taught and the method of
teaching must
all be taken into account. Intellectual ability and
saholastic
achievement are not unitary concepts.
84.
This study could perhaps have been extend~d ill a number of ways.
Firstly, administration to the sample of a number of tests of
cognitive style would have given empirical proof (or otherwise)
of the theoretical position that these styles all reflect the
sine;le "umbrella" concept of cognitive complexity. In the light
of Hudson's (1967) convergence/divergence argument from which this
study has drawn so strongly, this is one style that ought to have
been explored.
Secondly this study has not examined inter - and intra - school
variables. One of the most important of these is social class.
From the theory put forward and fr)m numerous studies (e:g. Hunt
and Dopyera 1966, Hess and Shipman 1965, Hunt and Hardt 1967)
one would expect socio-ecollowic-status to be strongly correlated
with complexity level. Therefore, the distribution of the schools
and the sample in terms of S.E.S. may be an important variable.
This was not examined.
4nother inter-school factor not controlled for is the fact that
some schools are tr~ditionally oriented in specific directions.
For example, at least sixty pupils (i.e. almost 25% of the s~mple)
came from an higher S.E.S. school with a strong science orientation.
As a result, pressures other than cognitive would be exerted on
the pupil to achieve in a given direction. Although it may be
argued that such conformity is indicative of low complexity, this
is not altogether satisfactory as our education system has very
littJe room for non-conformity.
A third "school" factor not controlled for ia the popularity
of the teachers of the Various subjects - an inaividual may state
preference/ ••••
preference for a school-subject simply because he li
kes the
~eacher. However, one trusts th3t this sort of fact
or is minimised
in a large sample.
Thirdly, this study has been confined to a male samp
le. Indic-
ations are that a female sample would behave somewha
t differently.
(See e.g. Mischel and Mischel 1971 and Lesser 1971.)
This sex
variable would therefore have to be-explored.
The greatest single criticism, however, that can be
directed
against this study resides in the complexity measure
used. It
can be argued that the whole investigation is tautol
ogical in that
the instrument used to measure cognitive complexity
was such that
it would discriminate between the arts and science o
riented
individual's and that the findings of this study are
as a result,
artefactual. It could be argued that the linguistic
nature of
the test and the items used (Modern Art, Politics, P
e~pl~,.etQ'~)
could be expected to favour the linguistically-adept
and 8ocially-
involved arts students. It would therefore come as
no surprise to
find that people who make complex statements about s
ocial stimuli
are socially oriented. However, this does not expla
in their
original involvement in, and preference for, the art
s and humanities.
At worst, therefore, this criticism means that a hig
h level of
compleXity and social awareness derive from the same
source. As
such, the complexity test maintains its predictive v
alidity and




Arguing from the cognitivist view-point that the individual
actively interprets his environment, it was hypothesised that
a "fit" or match between characteristics of the individual's
cognitive structure and of his environment would express itself
in satisfaction with and high achievement in that environment.
It was argued that the numerous cognitive styles could be accounted
for in terms of the complexity of the individual's cognitive
structure. Having argued that the sciences differ from the arts
and humanities in terms of the number of variables _impinging
on anyone topic, it was hYP?thesised that cognitive simple
subjects would be drawn to the sciences and more complex individuals
to the arts.
Results indicated that while the simple subjects both preferred
and achieved higher in the sciences, the complex subjects achieved
equally highly in the arts and the soiences,though they preferred
the more complex arts. This was interpreted- as indicating the
ability of complex individuals to achieve equally wellmlsimple
and complex tasks though preferring the complex environment while
the simple subjects were restricted to simple tasks.
The implications of these findings to teaching and to a possible
reduction in the number of scientists emerging from our schools
as a result of more "democratic" and more complex teaching patterns
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